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Michael H. v. Gerald D: Upholding the Marital
Presumption Against a Dual Paternity Claim
In the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.1 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of California's conclusive presumption2
that a child born to a married woman cohabiting with her husband
(who is neither impotent nor sterile) is the issue of the husband. The
sharply divided Court3 concluded that California was not required to
recognize a claim of paternity asserted by a man other than the husband
when the mother of the child was married to and cohabiting with the
husband at the times of conception and birth and both the mother and
the husband wish to raise the child as their own.
A plurality of four said that it is not unconstitutional for California
to prefer the husband over the natural father as the exclusive legal
father of the child and to prohibit inquiries into the paternity of a child
in this situation. 4 The plurality then used a substantive due process
analysis5 to determine that the "adulterous natural father ' 6 had no
fundamental liberty interest in a relationship with the child.
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2333, rehearing denied, 110 S. Ct. 22 (1989).
2. Cal. Evid. Code § 621 (West Supp. 1990) states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the issue of a wife cohabiting with
her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a
child of the marriage.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), if the court finds that
the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon blood
tests . . . are that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of
paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised
by the husband not later than two years from the date of the child's birth.
(d) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be raised
by the mother of the child not later than two years from the child's date of
birth if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court ac-
knowledging paternity of the child.
3. 109 S. Ct. at 2336. Scalia, J., wrote for the plurality and was joined by Rehnquist,
C. J., and in part by O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J., and in part by Stevens, J., id.
at 2336-46. O'Connor, J., wrote a concurring opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined, id.
at 2346-47. Stevens, J., wrote a concurring opinion, id. at 2347-49. Brennan, J., writing,
dissented and Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., joined, id. at 2349-59. White, J., writing,
dissented and Brennan, J., joined, id. at 2360-63.
4. Id. at 2345-46 (Scalia, J., writing, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and joined in part
by O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J.).
5. Id. at 2336-46.
6. Id. at 2345.
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The fifth Justice in the majority agreed that California may regard
the husband as the exclusive legal father, but disagreed with the plur-
ality's conclusion that a natural father never has a fundamental liberty
interest "in a case like this." 7 Using a procedural due process analysis,
he determined that because the natural father was allowed an adequate
hearing on the issue of visitation, California had not denied the natural
father procedural due process of law.
Four Justices dissented.' They analogized this case, which involved
a child of an intact marriage of the mother to a man presumed to be
the father, with cases in which the Court has favored protection of
father-child relationships that began and developed when the mother
was not married. They preferred to use a procedural due process analysis
and would have upheld the natural father's right to establish his pa-
ternity.
Purpose
The purpose of this note is twofold: (1) to examine the opinions
of the majority to discern how the decision in Michael H. affects the
current status of the protection of a natural father's rights under the
due process clause; and (2) to explore the extent to which the case
signals a change in the Court's analysis of individual rights under the
due process clause.
In Part I, this note will present summaries of the facts and the
Court's opinions. In Part II, this note will show that since the decision
of Michael H. the state need not recognize a claim to establish filiation
between the child of a marital union9 and a man other than the husband
when the mother and presumed father wish to raise the child as their
own. In addition, Part II of this note will show that the state may
summarily deny the natural father's claim for mere visitation rights.
Part III will examine the new substantive due process analysis articulated
by Justice Scalia writing for the plurality. This new mode of analysis
weighs state interests more heavily than that used in prior substantive
due process cases. The conservative plurality used it to articulate in
substantive due process terminology a preference for traditional family
values despite past Court decisions that could have been read to require
a different result. If the Court increasingly takes a more conservative
view of the fourteenth amendment rights, this mode of analysis could
see more widespread use.
7. Id. at 2347-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 2349-59 (Brennan, J., writing, dissented and Marshall, J., and Blackmun,
J., joined); id. at 2360-63 (White, J., writing, dissented and Brennan, J., joined).
9. The term "child of a marital union" will be used throughout this note to refer
to a child whose legal parents were married and cohabiting during the time of the child's
conception and birth.
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I. MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.
Factual Background
Carole D. and Gerald D. were married in 1976 and lived near Los
Angeles. 10 In 1978, Carole began an extramarital affair with Michael
H., a neighbor. In May 1981, Carole gave birth to Victoria D. Carole's
husband, Gerald, was present at the birth" and was named as the father
on the birth certificate. Soon thereafter, however, Carole informed Mi-
chael that he could be Victoria's father.
In October 1981, Gerald left Los Angeles for New York to begin
a new job. Later that month, Carole, Michael and Victoria had blood
tests which showed a 98.070 probability that Michael was the father
of Victoria. Over the next three year period, Carole, Victoria and Michael
intermittently resided together, holding themselves out as a family during
two separate time periods: first, for three months in St. Thomas, Virgin
Islands, where Michael had business interests, and second, after a one-
year hiatus, during which Michael filed his filiation action, for a period
of eight months. For those eight months, Michael, Carole and Victoria
lived in Carole's Los Angeles apartment while Gerald resided and worked
in New York. During this time Carole signed a stipulation that Michael
was the father of Victoria.
Michael's petition asked for a declaration of paternity, establishment
of a parent-child relationship under California's enactment of the Uni-
form Parentage Act,' 2 and a court order fixing child support and vis-
10. 109 S. Ct. at 2337-38. The facts are taken from the text of the plurality opinion
unless otherwise indicated.
11. Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 4, id. (No. 87-746).
12. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 7000-21 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). The Uniform Parentage
Act provides a method whereby a parent-child relationship may be established "regardless
of the marital status of the parents." Cal. Civ. Code § 7002 (West 1983). Cal. Evid.
Code § 621 (West Supp. 1990), was engrafted onto the enactment of the Uniform Parentage
Act by the California legislature. A father seeking to establish a parent-child relationship
under the provisions of the Act is precluded from doing so by the conclusive presumption
embodied in § 621:
Section 7004.(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he
meets the conditions as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code or in
any of the following paragraphs:
(4) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child
as his natural child.
(b) Except as provided in Section 621 of the Evidence Code, a presumption
under this section is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof
and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing
evidence.
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itation. 13 Victoria's court-appointed guardian ad litem filed a cross
complaint alleging that Victoria should be allowed to maintain rela-
tionships with both Michael and Gerald should Michael prove that he
is her father. Alternatively, she sought a visitation order under Cali-
fornia's statute providing for visitation of a non-parent . 4
Gerald and Carole never legally separated or divorced. Carole never
filed the stipulation in the filiation action; indeed, soon after signing it
she, with Victoria, returned to Gerald. Gerald then intervened in the
suit. He and Carole maintained that Michael's claim presented no triable
issues of fact. They argued that California Civil Code section 62115
stated a conclusive presumption as to third parties that the husband of
the mother is the father of any child born during the husband's marriage
to the mother. The trial court granted Gerald's motion for summary
judgment, dismissing Michael's and Victoria's claims and refusing to
order support payments or to make provision for permanent visitation.
California's Second District Court of Appeal affirmed.1 6
California Evidence Code section 62117 allows only the husband in
a disavowal action, or the mother if the biological father acknowledges
paternity to the court, to present blood test evidence that the husband
is not the father of the child. On appeal of the trial court's summary
judgment denying all claims, the appellate court found section 621 was
constitutional using a test weighing Michael's and Victoria's interests
against the interests of the state. Section 621, the court said, validly
served three state interests: preservation of the integrity of the matri-
monial family; protection of the child's welfare by preserving stable,
Section 7006.(b) Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the
purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child
relationship presumed under paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 7004.
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 7004, 7006 (West Supp. 1990).
13. Joint Appendix at 9-12, Michael H. (No. 87-746).
14. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1001-04, 1013, 236 Cal. Rptr.
810, 812-14, 820 (Ct. App. 1987).
At the time of the suit in the lower court, California's statute governing visitation of
a minor child, Cal. Civ. Code § 4601, stated:
Reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to a parent unless it is shown that
the visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the
discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child.
Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West 1983); 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1013 n.5, 236 Cal. Rptr. at
820 n.5.
15. For the text of Cal. Evid. Code § 621 (West Supp. 1990), see supra note 2.
16. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App.
1987).
17. For the pertinent text of Cal. Evid. Code § 621 (West Supp. 1990), see supra
note 2.
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developed parent-child relationships in preference to those relationships
which the legal parents oppose; and protection of a child from the
social stigma of being branded the issue of an adulterous union."8 In
addition, the appellate court upheld the trial court's denial of visitation
under the portion of California Civil Code section 4601 which provides
that a non-parent may be awarded visitation if, in the trial court's
discretion, it is in the best interest of the child. 9
The Issues Presented to the United States Supreme Court
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Michael and Victoria claimed that
California's statutory scheme denied them procedural due process by
denying them a particularized evidentiary hearing to establish biological
paternity. 20 They also claimed that they were denied substantive due
process by the lower court's application of section 621, urging that they
each have a fundamental liberty interest in a relationship with the other
that cannot be outweighed by the professed state interests of protecting
family integrity and child welfare. Those interests, they argued, were
not served by the use of section 621 in this instance, first, because
actual family integrity did not exist in the Gerald-Carole-Victoria marital
family due to Carole's cohabitation with Michael, and, second, because
Victoria's interests could not be truly served when she was denied the
right to continue her relationship with her biological father.
18. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1009, 1010, 236 Cal. Rptr.
810, 818, 819 (Ct. App. 1987).
19. Id. at 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The court found, on the strength of an earlier
case in which the biological father sought to overcome the marital presumption, that
visitation as an "other interested person" by one who sought and failed to establish
paternity is not in the best interest of the child. Compare, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1013,
236 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21, to Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807, 103 S. Ct. 31 (1982). See also Michelle
W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748, 703 P.2d 88 (1985), appeal
dismissed, 474 U.S. 1043, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986) and In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636. 119
Cal. Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123, cert. denied sub nom. Purzucek v. Towner, 421 U.S. 1014,
95 S. Ct. 2421 (1975). It appears that the California court determined as a matter of
law that a biological father is barred by the marital presumption from establishing his
paternity and may not visit the child when he is opposed by the legal parents. But see
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2347-49 (Stevens, J., concurring). See infra
text accompanying notes 73-81.
20. Michael also brought an equal protection claim which was not considered by the
Court since it was neither raised nor passed upon in the lower court. The claims of
Michael are set forth in the plurality opinion, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. at
2338-40. Victoria's claims are set forth in the plurality opinion. Id. at 2346. The arguments
made on the issue of "actual family integrity" and Victoria's interest in establishing her
parentage are found at Appellant's Brief on the Merits for Michael H. at 23-25, id. (No.
87-746), and Appellant's Brief on the Merits for Victoria D. at 41-42, id. (No. 87-746).
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Victoria presented an equal protection challenge to section 621. She
alleged that she ought to be afforded the same rights as her mother
and her presumed father to challenge the marital presumption. Cali-
fornia's limitation on standing to challenge the presumption was not
justified, she argued, by a need to preserve family integrity.2
The Plurality Opinion: A Summary
Michael's Claim
The plurality treated the constitutional challenge to California Ev-
idence Code section 621 under a substantive due process analysis. Justice
Scalia pointed out that section 621, while procedural in its use in the
disavowal action, serves the additional purpose of implementing the
substantive legislative policy decision that a natural father may not
establish his paternity of a child born during the mother's marriage to
another man. Hence the Court, said the plurality, should analyze this
substantive law under a substantive due process analysis. 22
Michael's interest was found not to be a fundamental liberty interest.
The plurality defined "fundamental liberty interest" to be an interest
that is "not merely . . . 'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation, is
hard to objectify), but also that [is] an interest traditionally protected
by our society" and "rooted in history and tradition. '2 3 The purpose
of using tradition to determine whether a liberty interest is fundamental
is "to prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important
traditional values-not to enable this Court to invent new ones. "24
To ascertain whether Michael's interest should be afforded protection
under the due process clause, the plurality sought to determine "whether
the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria
has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices
of our society. '1 2s The plurality found that nothing in the sources con-
sulted nor any evidence to which it resorted
21. The text presents the plurality's characterizations of Victoria's equal protection
claim. Victoria made other equal protection arguments as well. She alleged that § 621
creates unfair classifications based upon marital status and gender: she was denied the
right afforded to other natural (or illegitimate) children to establish biological paternity
because her female parent was married to a man other than her father. These classifications,
argued Victoria, are not supported by the state interest in family integrity. Appellant's
Brief on the Merits for Victoria D. at 31-41, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (No. 87-746); Appellant's
Reply Brief for Victoria D. at 3-4, id. The plurality stated that Victoria is not illegitimate.
109 S. Ct. at 2346.
22. 109 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
23. Id. at 2341-42.
24. Id. at 2341 n.2.
25. Id. at 2342.
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address[es] specifically the power of the natural father to assert
parental rights over a child born into a woman's existing mar-
riage with another man. Since it is Michael's burden to establish
that such a power (at least where the natural father has estab-
lished a relationship with the child) is so deeply embedded within
our traditions as to be fundamental, the lack of evidence alone
might defeat his case. But ... even in modern times ... the
ability of a person in Michael's position to claim paternity has
not been generally acknowledged. 26
Because a declaration of paternity alone has no legal consequences, said
the plurality, Michael must show that society has traditionally given
those like him substantive parental rights, or at least has not denied
them. No states have granted substantive parental prerogatives to persons
in Michael's position, said the plurality. Even though some states have
granted the "natural father" who has not established a relationship with
the child the "theoretical power" to rebut the marital presumption,
[w]hat counts is whether the States in fact award substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within
and born into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace
the child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that
has done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights
qualifying as liberty interests are made. 27
The sources used by the plurality to identify relevant historical
traditions protected by our society were the common law texts of Brac-
ton, Blackstone, Schouler, and others dated from the sixteenth to the
nineteenth centuries, as well as a 1957 American Law Reports Note on
the state laws that limited standing to overcome the marital presump-
tion.2 The plurality found no societal protection therein for any standing
that Michael might have to assert his paternity. This, together with a
failure to find a "single case, old or new,''29 granting someone like
Michael substantive parental rights, led to the conclusion that Michael's
interest had no societal protection in our nation's historical traditions.
The plurality concluded that Michael's interest was not a fundamental
liberty interest.
The plurality also concluded that the legal, marital father is entitled
to constitutional protection as the exclusive father of Victoria.30 The
plurality noted that the sources it used to determine the nonexistence
26. Id. at 2343 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 2344 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 2342-43.
29. Id. at 2344.
30. Id. at 2345-46.
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of Michael's interest also revealed the justifications for the conclusiveness
of the state imposed presumption in favor of Gerald: to protect the
child from stigma and to promote peace within the marital family. Even
since relaxation of rigid state protection for the marital family, the
plurality said, "our traditions have protected the marital family (Gerald,
Carole and the children they acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort
of claim Michael asserts." 3 ' This goal of protection of the marital family,
said the plurality, is obviously impaired by facilitating suits against
husband and wife asserting that their children are illegitimate. a2 Of the
fact that section 621 permits the husband or the wife in some instances
to prove that the child is not the husband's,33 the plurality said that
when the husband is impotent or sterile, or when the couple has not
been cohabiting, it is "less likely that the paternity hearing will disrupt
an otherwise harmonious and apparently exclusive marital relationship." 3 4
The plurality said that its result is not inconsistent with earlier
decisions on the rights of natural fathers. Those decisions, stated the
plurality, rest on the historical respect for relationships that develop
within the unitary family. 3 To remain consistent with those decisions,
said the plurality, the Court must treat Michael's claim in its context
as a competing claim against that of Gerald, the legal father, for exclusive
paternity of Victoria.3 6 The plurality observed that the necessary choice
between the two conflicting claims is validly left to the California leg-
islature. 7
In footnote six of the plurality opinion, from which Justices O'Con-
nor and Kennedy dissented, Justice Scalia elaborated on the plurality's
methodology. He described the methodology as "using historical tra-
ditions specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous natural father
rather than inquiring more generally 'whether parenthood is an interest
that historically has received our attention and protection.""'3 He de-
fended the method of referring to the asserted interest at the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting (or denying pro-
tection to) the right may be identified. Only if no tradition could be
identified for the treatment of the "adulterous natural father," reasoned
31. Id. at 2342.
32. Id. at 2340-46.
33. Cal. Evid. Code § 621 (West Supp. 1990). See supra note 2 for the pertinent
text of this tatute.
34. 109 S. Ct. at 2340 n.1.
35. Id. at 2342.
36. Id. at 2342 n.4, 2345, noting that California has no provision for dual paternity,
and stating, "Here, to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny
protection to a marital father."
37. Id. at 2345-46.
38. Id. at 2344 n.6 (plurality opinion).
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Justice Scalia, should the Court analogize such a person's liberty interest
with that of natural fathers in general. A reference to tradition, in the
most precise terms possible, states footnote six, ensures that the Court
will not be guilty of arbitrary decision-making in the area of substantive
due process.
In footnote six, Justice Scalia cited two decisions, Roe v. Wade39
and Bowers v. Hardwick,40 that support consulting the current state law
governing the asserted liberty interest at hand in order to see if the
interest is protected. 41 The approach is not inconsistent with Griswold
v. Connecticut42 or Eisenstadt v. Baird,43 remarked Justice Scalia, since
neither of these cases "acknowledged a longstanding and still extant
societal tradition withholding the very right pronounced to be the subject
of a liberty interest and then rejected it." '44
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy dissented from footnote six. Of the
alleged use of the methodology in the past, Justice O'Connor wrote,
"On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting
asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific
level' available." '45 Of the future applicability of the plurality's mode
of analysis, she said that she "would not foreclose the unanticipated
by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis" that is
not necessarily the one used in the Court's past decisions.46
Victoria's Claim
The plurality found that Victoria had no due process right to main-
tain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald. For the same
reasons and under the same analysis set forth by the plurality with
regard to Michael's claim, Victoria's claim also failed. History and
tradition do not recognize dual paternity, observed the plurality, and
likewise they do not recognize a child's interest in her relationship with
a natural father when she has a legal father .47
The plurality also disposed of Victoria's equal protection challenge
in summary fashion. Applying rational scrutiny, the plurality said that
the state's legitimate interest in the integrity of the marital family justified
treating Victoria differently from her parents in denying her, but not
them, the chance to overcome the marital presumption. Strict scrutiny
39. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
40. 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
41. 109 S. Ct. at 2344 n.6.
42. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
43. 405 U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972).
44. 109 S. Ct. at 2344-45 n.6.
45. Id. at 2346 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 2347 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 2346.
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should not be used to determine if Victoria was treated differently "on
the basis of her illegitimacy." ' 48 "Illegitimacy is a legal construct, not
a natural trait. Under California law, Victoria is not illegitimate, and
she is treated in the same manner as all other legitimate children: she
is entitled to maintain a filial relationship with her legal parents. 49
Justice Stevens' Opinion: A Summary
Justice Stevens, concurring and writing separately, agreed with the
plurality that, inasmuch as no substantive legal rights come with a mere
declaration of paternity, the state has no obligation to make such a
declaration. Michael's interest, however, said Stevens, is strong enough
to give him a "constitutional right to try to convince a trial judge that
Victoria's best interests would be served by granting him visitation
rights."'" In Stevens' view, the California court gave him that right,
and the trial judge validly denied visitation:
Under the circumstances of the case before us, Michael was
given a fair opportunity to show that he is Victoria's natural
father, that he had developed a relationship with her, and that
her interests would be served by granting him visitation rights.
On the other hand, the record also shows that after its rather
shaky start, the marriage between Carole and Gerald developed
a stability that now provides Victoria with a loving and har-
monious family home .... I find nothing fundamentally unfair
about the exercise of a judge's discretion that, in the end, allows
the mother to decide whether her child's best interest would be
served by allowing the natural father visitation privileges. Because
I am convinced that the trial judge had the authority under
state law both to hear Michael's plea for visitation rights and
to grant him such rights if Victoria's best interests so warranted,
I am satisfied that the California statutory scheme is consistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 2
48. Id.
49. Id. A detailed analysis of the Court's handling of Victoria's claim is beyond the
scope of this note. It should be noted that the plurality's characterization of Victoria's
equal protection claim is not necessarily complete. The plurality did not consider Victoria's
claim that she was denied protection equal to that given to children whose mothers were
not married at the time of conception and birth. See supra note 21.
50. Id. at 2347.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2348-49 (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra note 19; see infra text ac-
companying notes 73-81.
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The Dissenting Opinions: A Summary
The dissenters stated that proper substantive due process analysis
required, first, that the court identify Michael's interest as that of a
natural father in his relationship with his child and, second, that it
determine by analogy with the court's previous decisions on natural
fathers' rights whether Michael's interest warranted protection." They
would have, however, used procedural due process analysis. They con-
cluded that, because under prior decisions on natural fathers' rights
Michael's interest warranted protection, and because the state interest
in protecting family integrity and preventing social stigma is small when
the husband already knows of the natural father's claim, California's
refusal to allow Michael to establish paternity was a violation of pro-
cedural due process . 4
II. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY's DENIAL OF TE NATURAL FATHER'S
CLAIM
Michael H. could be read to hold that states need not recognize a
claim to establish filiation between the child of a marital union" and
a man other than the husband when the mother and presumed father
wish to raise the child as their own. The plurality opinion clearly supports
this proposition.5 6 On the other hand, Michael H. could require that
the natural father be allowed a hearing for the purpose of establishing
visitation. The answer depends upon how one reads the opinion of
Justice Stevens.
Justice Stevens' opinion was based upon a misperception of the
issues before the Court and of the operation of California law on the
right to visitation. 7 The extent to which Justice Stevens actually con-
curred in the plurality's denial of Michael's claim is questionable.
The opinions will be analyzed in turn in order to demonstrate that,
ultimately, Justice Stevens supports the proposition that the State may
summarily deny the claim of the natural father seeking to establish
paternity or visitation of the child of a marital union when the legal
parents oppose the claim."
The Plurality Opinion: An Analysis
A substantive due process analysis involves a balancing test for
deciding whether a state may place limits on individual liberty. It requires
53. Id. at 2349-59 (Brennan, J., writing, joined by Blackmun, J., and Marshall, J.);
id. at 2360 (White, J., writing, joined by Brennan, J.).
54. Id.
55. See supra note 9.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 59-72.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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the identification of a liberty interest, an evaluation of the interest to
determine whether the interest .is fundamental or "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," 5 9 the identification of the state's interest sought to
be accomplished by the challenged rule of law, and a weighing process
to determine if the state interest is sufficiently important to justify the
rule's limitation upon the individual's liberty. 60 In Michael H., the
plurality arrived at a two-pronged conclusion. First, it concluded that
the natural father of a child conceived and born during the marriage
of the mother to another man has no fundamental liberty interest in
his relationship with the child when the mother and her husband wish
to raise the child as their own. 61 It also concluded that California's
interest in family integrity and privacy justified its preference for the
marital father over the natural father as exclusive father of Victoria. 62
It disclaimed any effort to independently balance the state interest against
the asserted individual liberty. Instead, it concluded that society had
already balanced the two and had favored the state interest. 63
The plurality observed that all parental prerogatives would be granted
to Michael by California law if he established that he is Victoria's
father. Gerald was already the father, it noted, and under California
law Victoria could have only one father. California may determine for
itself whether to grant Gerald or Michael paternal status. 64
The plurality noted that California does not provide for dual pa-
ternity. This is true because of the existence of section 621's conclusive
presumption of the husband's paternity, the constitutionality of which
Michael H. purported to test. 65 Gerald was not necessarily at risk of
losing all parental rights to Michael; he was at risk of losing the
exclusivity of his paternal status, which the Court couched in terms of
"family integrity and privacy." "Family integrity" is Gerald's freedom
to continue as Victoria's only father for as long as he wishes66 and his
freedom from inquiries into the paternity of the child conceived by and
59. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 151 (1937).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
61. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344-46 (1989).
62. Id. at 2345-46.
63. Id. at 2345 n.7. For a discussion of the methodology the plurality used to reach
this conclusion, see infra text accompanying notes 89-114.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 12. See also Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703
P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1985) appeal dism'd, 474 U.S. 1043, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986)
(denying paternity claim of natural father who, after legal parents' divorce, had married
mother, where legal father wished to continue to act as father and opposed paternity
claim).
66. See 109 S. Ct. at 2345 n.7 where the plurality says it might reach a different
result when the marital parents do not wish to raise the child as their own.
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born to his wife during their marriage.6 7 Family integrity is antithetical
to recognition of any paternity claim other than the husband's. The
historic tradition of protection of family integrity was sufficient justi-
fication for the plurality both to deny the existence of Michael's asserted
fundamental liberty interest and to recognize the state's right to maintain
an exclusive paternity regime that favors the husband. 61
The plurality's use of family integrity refers to legal integrity of the
marital family. The plurality did not consider the fact that Gerald's
family had been factually impugned when Carole and Michael had sexual
relations and when Carole, Michael, and Victoria lived together as a
family. It did not question the husband's, nor the natural father's,
personal commitment to fatherhood. At the same time, it took into
account the adulterous origin of Michael's de facto relationship to
Victoria. It determined that Michael's and Victoria's relationship had
not been treated as a protected family unit under our historic practices. 69
The Michael H. plurality's use of the family as the focus of analysis
is a departure from the Court's prior treatment of natural fathers' rights.
Before Michael H., the Court had developed a test that focused on the
biological link and the actual personal relationship between the natural
father and child rather than on the family unit. 70 The biological link
was a threshold requirement to establish parental rights. In cases where
the natural father prevailed, the determinative factor was the extent of
the demonstrated commitment of the father to act as parent to the
child .71
The critical distinction between those cases and Michael H. is that
none of those cases involved a mother who was married at the time of
conception and birth. The significance of this distinction is that when
the mother is married, the natural father's interest in the relationship
with the child is pitted against the legal father's interest in freedom
67. 109 S. Ct. 2342-43, 2345 n.7; see supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
68. The plurality observed, but did not decide, that non-marital, "unitary" families
might also deserve constitutional protection. 109 S. Ct. at 2342 n.3. Those included as
"unitary" are the "household(s)" of unmarried parents and their children; excluded is
the relationship "between a married woman, her lover and their child, during a 3-month
sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent 8-month period, when, if he happened
to be in Los Angeles, he stayed with her and the child." Id.
69. The plurality stated that it could not ignore the circumstances of the conception
of the child because to do so would lead to the conclusion "that if Michael had begotten
Victoria by a rape, that fact would in no way affect his possession of a liberty interest
in his relationship with her." 109 S. Ct. at 2342 n.4.
70. E.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98
S. Ct. 549 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
71. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State L.J. 313, 319-24 (1984).
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from intrusions into his legal family. The Michael H. plurality cited an
earlier opinion by Justice Stevens in which the Court denied a natural
father the right to veto adoption by the mother's new husband. The
plurality highlighted the distinction presented by the. marriage:
[A]lthough in some circumstances the actual relationship between
father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father
parental interests comparable to those of the married father, the
absence of a legal tie with the mother may in such circumstances
appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional
claims might otherwise exist.7 2
Before Michael H., the Court considered the extent of the factual
commitment of the natural father. Now, under the plurality's disposition,
to the extent that Justice Stevens concurred in that disposition, the
presence of the marriage tie of the mother to another man at the times
of conception and birth and the married couple's opposition to the
natural father's claim may be the basis for denial of any claim based
on a de facto relationship between the natural father and the child. In
the instance of an intact marriage, the state may ignore what might
have been a protected constitutional right of the natural father if the
mother had not been married. To protect the husband's constitutional
right to remain exclusive legal father, it is permissable, as a legislative
policy choice, to limit the natural father's constitutional right.
Justice Stevens' Opinion: An Analysis
The extent to which Justice Stevens, who formed the majority with
his concurring opinion, actually agrees with the plurality is unclear. First
he stated: "I agree with Justice Scalia that the Federal Constitution
imposes no obligation upon a State to 'declare facts unless some legal
consequence hinges upon the requested declaration.' '7 Justice Stevens
did not question the extent of the state's power to create or withhold
those "legal consequences."
Yet Justice Stevens went on to a second issue: "Does the California
statute deny appellants a fair opportunity to prove that Victoria's best
interests would be served by granting Michael visitation rights?"' 74 He
answered first by assuming that "Michael's relationship with Victoria
is strong enough to give him a constitutional right to try to convince
a trial judge that Victoria's best interest would be served by granting
72. 109 S. Ct. at 2345, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 n.16, 103 S.
Ct. 2985, 2993 n.16 (1983) (citations omitted).
73. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2347 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
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him visitation rights."" Then he concluded that California's statutory
scheme gave Michael that right:
Because I am convinced that the trial judge had the authority
under state law both to hear Michael's plea for visitation rights
and to grant him such rights if Victoria's best interests so
warranted, I am satisfied that the California statutory scheme
is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment .76
Justice Stevens' perception that Michael was afforded a particularized
hearing on visitation is not well-founded. Michael did not seek mere
visitation rights. He sought a declaration of paternity and consequent
entitlement to a presumption that he be allowed visitation as a parent.
Only Victoria sought, as alternative relief, visitation rights under the
clause of California's visitation law 77 that provides for the trial judge's
use of discretion in granting visitation to non-parents after a determi-
nation of the child's best interests. The trial court determined on the
basis of an earlier case that as a matter of law no visitation should be
awarded to anyone asserting paternity when the married parents oppose
the claim. 78 Justice Stevens, alone among the Justices, disagreed that
the trial court ruled in this summary way. He decided that the trial
court denied visitation after particularized findings on factors that were
considered in the Court's decisions on unwed fathers' rights: biological
link, developed relationship, and best interest factors such as the natural
father's length of residence with the child and mother and the child's
ability to cope with having two fathers. 79 In addition, he read the record
to reflect that "after its rather shaky start, the marriage between Carole
and Gerald developed a stability that now provides Victoria with a loving
and harmonious family home." 80 Contrary to Justice Stevens' suggestion,
none of the factors he named-biological link, actual relationship, the
best interests of Victoria, and the stability of the marriage-were issues
of fact in the trial court.8" The trial court granted summary judgment
75. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 52.
76. Id. at 2348-49.
77. Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West 1983); see supra note 14.
78. See Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West 1983). Compare 109 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (Stevens,
J., concurring); id. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal.
App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1987); Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App.
3d 619, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807, 103 S. Ct. 31 (1982);
In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123, cert. denied sub nom.
Porzucek v. Towner, 421 U.S. 1014, 95 S. Ct. 2421 (1975).
79. 109 S. Ct. at 2347-48.
80. Id. at 2348.
81. The record contained evidence bearing on the issue of pendente lite visitation,
which was awarded and then terminated by the trial court. See Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1987).
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dismissing claims for a paternity declaration and permanent visitation.
Justice Stevens' opinion could be read to require that one claiming
paternity against opposing legal parents be allowed to establish paternity
for the limited purpose of obtaining visitation. Under this reading, the
marital family integrity and privacy so important to the plurality could
be destroyed since the award of visitation would be based on a showing
of biological link, de facto relationship, and a failure of the married
couple to maintain the requisite stability of family home life.
Justice Stevens' opinion read in light of his other opinions in unwed
fathers' cases, however, shows that he would seldom, if ever, support
an award of visitation when the legal parents oppose the claim. First,
in Michael H., the stability of the marital union between the presumed
father and the mother and their ability to provide the child with a
loving home was enough to justify, for Justice Stevens, the trial court's
ruling denying a visitation claim which the mother opposed. In another
case denying the unwed father's right to veto his child's adoption, Justice
Stevens said:
[H]ere we are concerned with the rights the unwed father may
have when his wishes and those of the mother are in conflict,
and the child's best interests are served by a resolution in favor
of the mother. It seems to me that the absence of a legal tie
with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately place
a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might oth-
erwise exist by virtue of the father's actual relationship with the
children.82
Dissenting in a third case from a holding that struck down an adoption
by the mother's new husband that had taken place over the natural
father's veto, Justice Stevens said:
Although some Members of the Court have concluded that
greater protection is due the "private realm of family life," this
appeal does not fall within that realm because whatever family
life once surrounded [the natural father], his children and [the
mother] has long since dissolved through no fault of the State's.
In fact, it is the State, rather than the [natural father], that
may rely in this case on the importance of the family insofar
as it is the state that is attempting to foster the establishment
and privacy of new and legitimate adoptive families. 83
82. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62 n.16, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2992-93 n.16
(1983) (citing dissent by Stewart, J., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397, 99 S. Ct.
1760, 1771 (1979)).
83. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 414 n.27, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1779 n.27 (1979)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Even though Justice Stevens has stated that a constitutional right
might exist, he has never found for the natural father. In Michael H.,
his vague references to the stability of home life and the child's best
interests shed no light on what, if any, specific factors he would require
to support denial of the natural father's claim other than the existence
of a cohabiting, state-sanctioned family unit which opposes the claim.
He concluded that assuming an interest existed, it was adequately pro-
tected through a hearing that, in truth, never took place, and was validly
denied on the basis of facts which, in truth, were not established in
the trial court.
The most that can be said is that Justice Stevens favors the parental
relationships that arise in the context of a legitimate family over de
facto relationships which the legal parents oppose. Hence, his concur-
rence in Michael H. might not require an evidentiary hearing at all,
but only a summary judgment based on the opposition of the legal
parents. Any evidentiary hearing on visitation when the legal parents
oppose the claim would be pointless.
In summary, close analysis of the concurring opinion by Justice
Stevens raises a serious question regarding whether the state may always
deny the natural father a right to establish his paternity of a child
conceived and born during the mother's marriage to another man when
she and the presumed father oppose the paternity claim. If, however,
Justice Stevens' concurrence is read in light of his other opinions on
natural fathers' rights, his willingness to allow the state to deny such
a claim summarily is clear.
Even assuming that Michael H. supports the proposition that a
natural father's claim for paternity or visitation may be summarily denied
when opposed by the legal parents, for the denial of the natural father's
claim only under the facts of Michael H., another question arises. First,
are families with divorced legal parents who wish to raise the child
jointly entitled to state protection against a paternity claim? Justice
Scalia referred to the situation in which "the husband and wife wish
to raise her child jointly." s4 Because divorce does not change legal
parental status, the parents who are divorced at the time of the claim
could come within the state's protection. They, with their legal children,
form a family traditional enough in character to satisfy the plurality.
If the legal parents show that the claim intrudes upon their life as a
family (albeit a family that is not cohabiting), the plurality would
probably not require recognition of the claim. Since they form a "le-
gitimate family," Justice Stevens' requirement would be satisfied. In the
instance of the family with divorced legal parents, then the wish of the
legal parents to raise the child jointly and the state's traditional rec-
84. Id. at 2345 n.7.
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ognition of such a family as a legitimate family would entitle that family
to protection from a paternity claim by another man.
III. THE USE OF POSITIVE LAW SOURCES IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
The plurality's conclusion that Michael had no fundamental liberty
interest was founded on positive law sources. 5 For the plurality, a
fundamental liberty interest must be an interest traditionally protected
by society and recognized as such by the sources used by the Court.
The sources first used by the plurality were legal and historical texts
dating from the sixteenth century, the most recent of which was a 1957
Note of the American Law Reports. These sources revealed that interests
like Michael's had been expressly denied. The plurality then required
that Michael prove that his interest is "so deeply embedded within our
traditions as to be a fundamental right" by proving by case or statutory
law that substantive legal rights, and not merely the procedural right
to a hearing, had previously been afforded to persons in his situation.
Even though state law enactments exist today that would "theoretically" 6
give Michael the right he claimed, those did not establish for the plurality
that Michael had a fundamental liberty interest.
This method of determining the nature of the liberty interest stands
in stark contrast to the approach used in prior due process cases where
the right asserted was analogized to other rights already recognized by
the Court to determine the existence of a liberty interest.8 7
Discovering the Parent's Interest Before and Since Michael H.
Prior cases discussing the rights arising from family relationships
include decisions on the right of a natural father to be afforded a
hearing before his parental rights are terminated, 8 the right of foster
families to procedural safeguards before their de facto relationships with
foster children are terminated, 9 the right of a mother to sue for the
85. See supra text accompanying notes 25-44.
86. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 (1989); see supra text accom-
panying note 27.
87. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977); Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct.
2094 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
88. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S. Ct. 549
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
89. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 97 S. Ct. 2094 (1977).
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wrongful death of her out-of-wedlock child, 90 the right of out-of-wedlock
children to be treated equally with children of married parents, 91 the
right of extended family members to reside together,92 and the right of
parents to a showing of clear and convincing evidence before their
parental rights are terminated. 93 None of these cases searched sources
of positive law to conclude that the interest at stake was worthy of
protection. On the contrary, the origins of parental rights have not been
found in statutes, as are property rights; rather, they have been thought
to exist, as a matter of natural right, 94 as concomitants to parental
responsibility. 95
Only one prior case utilized a search of the positive law as the
foundation for reaching the conclusion that the liberty interest at stake
was or was not a fundamental one. In Bowers v. Hardwick, where the
plurality characterized the interest specifically as "a right to commit
homosexual sodomy," state laws criminalizing sodomy were listed, and
the interest was distinguished from those involving marriage, family and
procreation. The Court concluded that calling that interest fundamental
would be "at best, facetious."' '
90. See Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.
Ct. 1515 (1968).
91. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400
(1972); see also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973).
92. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
93. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
94. E.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 97 S. Ct. 2094 (1977) (the natural rights of parents find their roots in, and
thus, their contours must be sought from an examination. of, "intrinsic human right"
while the rights of foster families arise from, and their contours must be sought in, state
law and contractual sources). The Court has declared that it is 'plain beyond the need
for multiple citation that a natural parent's desire for and right to the companionship,
care, custody and management of his or her children is an interest' far more precious
than any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397
(1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18, 101
S. Ct. 2153 (1981)) (citations omitted).
95. Parents "have the right, coupled with the high duty," Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925), to recognize and prepare their children
"for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442 (1944). "Corresponding to the right 'of control, it is
the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 43 S. Ct. 625, 627 (1923). The importance
of a family relationship "stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the role
it plays in promoting a way of life through the instruction of children as well as from
the fact of blood relationship." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844, 97 S. Ct. 2094, 2109 (1977) (citations omitted). See
generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 (1983); Santosky
v. Kramer, 445 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982); Buchanan, supra note 71,
at 319-24.
96. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).
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In footnote six97 of the Michael H. plurality opinion, from which
two members of the plurality dissented, Justice Scalia elaborated on the
methodology used to determine objectively the existence of a liberty
interest. He pointed out that Roe v. Wade" also involved a survey of
state law cited to support the conclusion that there was no longstanding
tradition of laws proscribing abortion.
Contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion, Roe's review of the history
of abortion practices and its notation of the fact that the state laws
proscribing abortion were only of recent origin were not used in support
of the existence of the interest at stake there. In Roe, the determination
of the fundamental liberty interest was made after detailed review of
and analogy with the decisions of the Court that have borne on the
fundamental right of privacy.99 The Michael H. plurality did not engage
in the kind of analysis used in Roe to determine the existence of the
fundamental liberty interest. Rather, it first examined the positive law
sources for protection of Michael's right, specifically described as the
right of an adulterous natural father as distinguished from the right of
a parent. Only after concluding that the sources examined provided no
protection, the plurality compared its result to the Court's decisions on
the rights of unwed natural fathers.'°° Observing that Michael H. is
unique in that the natural father's right directly conflicts with those
rights arising from the husband's designation as legal father, the plurality
returned to the theme of states' rights and concluded that "[i]t is a
question of legislative policy and not constitutional law whether Cali-
fornia will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain
a child conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted."''
In the process of selecting the sources of evidence of tradition, the
plurality rejected current statutes and cases'0 2 granting the procedural
right to establish paternity. At the same time, it accepted the 1957
97. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344-45 n.6 (1989).
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
99. Id. at 153-55, 93 S. Ct. at 726-27.
100. 109 S. Ct. at 2345; see supra text accompanying notes 35-37 and 70-72.
101. 109 S. Ct. at 2345.
102. See supra text accompanying note 27. See Uniform Parentage Act 9B U.L.A.
287 (1987). The Uniform Parentage Act was drafted in answer to problems of enforcement
of parental obligations to illegitimate children. Id. (official comments). It purports to
mandate like treatment of all children and parents regardless of marital status of the
parents. Id. at 296, § 2. It entitles all persons to establish a parent-child relationship,
which is defined as "the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or
adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties
and obligations." Id. at 296, § 1.
Of 18 states enacting the Uniform Parentage Act, 15 states have enacted variations of
the act granting the right of action to establish paternity either to any father who has
lived with the child and held it out as his own, or to anyone alleging himself to be the
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American Law Reports Note on the state laws that limited standing to
overcome the marital presumption.103 According to the plurality, current
statutes and cases show merely the "theoretical power'' ° granted by
the states to a natural father to rebut the marital presumption. The fact
that there were no statutes or cases actually granting substantive parental
rights to such a person supported the plurality's conclusion that there
was no fundamental right in this case.
The plurality's rejection of these statutes and cases as evidence of
tradition results in an inconsistency in the plurality opinion. Justice
Scalia had written that California's conclusive presumption of paternity,
father, or to any interested person. See Ala. Code §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21 (1986) (but see
Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989) (denying standing to the biological father
now married to the mother, where the time has passed for the husband to disavow and
where the husband has continually supported the child and opposes the claim)); Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 19-6-101 to 19-6-129 (1986); see also R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo.
1980); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, §§ 801-818 (Supp. 1988) (see also In re Evans, No. 38,
266, 85-1-34-CV (Del. Fain. Ct. Feb. 23, 1988) (1988 WL 26784); Green v. Long, 547
A.2d 630 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1988)); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1988 & Supp.
1989); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 40, para. 2501-26 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1989); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§§ 38-1110 to 38-1129 (1986); Minn. Stat. §§ 257.51-.74 (Supp. 1990); Mont. Code Ann.
§§ 40-6-101 to 40-6-135 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 126.011-.391 (1987); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 9:17-38 to 17-59 (West 1976); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-11-1 to 40-11-23 (1986 Rplcmt.);
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26 (1981 & Supp. 1989); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 3111.01-.19 (Anderson' 1989) (see also Hulett v. Hulett, 45 Ohio 3d 288, 544 N.E.2d
257 (1989)); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.26.010-.26.905 (1986); Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-101
to 14-2-120 (1986 & Supp. 1988) (but see A. v. X., Y., and Z., 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021, 103 S. Ct. 388 (barring natural father from overcoming
the marital presumption)).
In Alabama and Wyoming the courts refused to interpret the statute as allowing the
natural father to rebut the marital presumption. Most of the enactments remain untested
on the issue. Conversely, at least three states' courts have expressly granted to the natural
father a right of action to rebut the marital presumption when the mother is married.
R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666, 670-72 (1980); In re Evans, No. 38,
266, 85-1-34-CV (Del. Fain. Ct. Feb. 23, 1988) (1988 WL 26784); Green v. Long, 547
A.2d 630 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1988); Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1985). See also Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989) (citing Finnerty v. Boyett with
approval). Five others have granted the right of action to the natural father or the child
after the mother's divorce even though the action is opposed by the ex-husband. See Van
Nostrand v. Olivieri, 427 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Simcox by and through
Dear v. Simcox, 175 Ill. App. 3d 473, 529 N.E.2d 1032 (App. Ct. 1988), aff'd in part
and vacated in part; Simcox v. Simcox, 131 111. 2d 491, 546 N.E. 2d 609 (1989); A. B.
v. C. D., 150 Ind. App. 535, 277 N.E. 599 (Ct. App. 1971); Hulett v. Hulett, 45 Ohio
3d 288, 544 N.E. 2d 257 (1989); Joseph v. Alexander, 12 Ohio 3d 88, 465 N.E. 2d 448
(1984); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d 299, 738 P.2d 254 (1987). Since Michael
H., the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that under Louisiana filiation and support
statutes a child has a right of action for support against a natural father where the child
was presumed to be the issue of another man. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989).
103. See supra text accompanying note 27.
104. 109 S. Ct. at 2344.
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by serving as a procedural bar to Michael's claim, served the policy of
denying Michael substantive rights. 05 Yet the plurality refused to rec-
ognize other states' currently enacted grants of the right of action as
evidence of society's intent to grant substantive parental rights. At the
same time, the 1957 American Law Reports Note showing that states
limited standing to overcome the marital presumption could serve as
evidence of society's intent to withhold substantive parental rights.
One explanation for the rejection of the current cases and statutes
is that they are too new to be considered as evidence of tradition. Justice
Scalia's use of the Roe analogy,'0 where he cited Roe as a rejection
of recently enacted abortion laws in a search for tradition, bears out
this explanation. Justice Scalia sought to use old, and to reject new,
positive law sources as evidence of tradition, where the old and new
were different. In addition, the recent statutes and cases granting the
procedural right do not reflect sufficient time-tested acceptance by leg-
islative majorities to justify their use as evidence of the plurality's notion
of tradition. 07 Notably, in Michael H., some of the new sources that
granted the procedural right rested upon United States Supreme Court
cases on natural fathers' rights. 0 Justice Scalia's method of selecting
sources of tradition weeded out those sources that had their origins in
the cases which the plurality sought to limit.1°9
In summary, the mode of substantive due process analysis used by
the plurality was a way to articulate the plurality's preference for tra-
ditional legal family relationships in the face of the United States Su-
preme Court precedents that favored recognition of de facto parental
relationships in a case of conflict between the two types of relationships.
Even though only two Justices committed to use of the mode of analysis
in the future, recognition of the plurality's methods should be useful
to the litigant in a suit pitting traditional interests against non-traditional
ones. And in light of upcoming changes in the makeup of the Court,
this mode of analysis may see more widespread use.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the majority opinions express much deference for
the states' protection of the marital family and affirm that the marital
family model may serve as the primary framework for determining the
105. See supra text accompanying note 22.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
107. See supra note 102.
108. See, e.g., R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 670-72 (Colo. 1980); Finnerty v.
Boyett, 469 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); see also Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847
(La. 1989); Nostrand v. Olivieri, 427 So. 2d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
109. For a discussion of the critical distinctions between the Michael H. plurality's
approach to natural fathers' rights and the Court's earlier approach, see supra text
accompanying notes 70-72.
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status of fathers. By repeated reference to the theme of states' rights
and to majoritarian interests as reflected in sources of positive law, the
plurality, with Justice Stevens' concurrence, concluded that the state
may grant to the presumed father exclusive paternity when the child
was conceived and born during the married couple's cohabitation when
the legal parents wish to raise the child as their own. Yet, by reference
to the natural father's individual procedural due process rights, Justice
Stevens, the fifth vote of the majority, concluded that the natural father
was granted an adequate hearing before a decision was reached on
whether his interest justified a grant of visitation. While the plurality
of four aimed to preclude any inquiry into the paternity and best interests
of a child under the Michael H. facts, Justice Stevens stated that he
relied upon that inquiry for the purpose of determining whether the
state validly denied visitation by the natural father. A close reading of
Justice Stevens' opinion, however, shows that it was probably enough
for the trial court to have based a summary denial of visitation merely
upon the legal parents' opposition to the claim.
The substantive due process analysis used by the plurality places
great weight on the side of states' rights and majoritarian interests. In
showing that a liberty interest is fundamental, the claimant must present
positive law as evidence that his interest has been historically protected
by our society. Only two Justices are committed to using this analysis
in the future, but four of them used it in Michael H. to affirm the
state's right to impose the marital presumption, and one additional
Justice concurred in the result.
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